Friday, September 2, 2022

It's All About Jobs -- Until It isn't -- September 2, 2022

Updates

September 2, 2022
: this is not stagflation --
  • definition of stagflation:
    • high unemployment
    • slowing economy
    • high inflation
  • situation:
    • unemployment? Look at U-1 (1.2%; if you want/need a job, you can get a job); even U-3 is "full employment"
    • slowing economy: behind us?
    • high inflation: it's all relative and nothing like the situation in England in 1970 when the coin was termed; in a country more fixated on jobs than overall economy
August, 2022, numbers:
  • The WSJ:
    • jobs growth resilient so far this year despite a contraction in the overall economy
    • employers created > 500,000 jobs in July, recovering all the 22 million jobs lost in early 2020 (pandemic)
    • unemployment rate has now matched a 50-year low
  • CNBC panel:
    • forecast
      • 290K; no number provided; 350K; 400K; R: 266K; SL: 250K (a little less than expected)
      • consensus: 381K
    • actual
      • 315K
      • 800K have come back into the labor force
      • unemployment rate jumps to 3.7%; highest since February, 2022 (3.8%
      • wage growth: up 0.3% vs 0.4% forecast
      • 62.4%; post-Covid high
      • U-6: 7% 
  • discussion after the numbers came out
    • DOW futures: jump; up 145 points
    • SL: something "goldilocks" about the number; particularly the 62.4$ participation rate
      • "absolutely goldilocks" 
    • blah, blah, blah,
    • Rick:
      • Fed: pain, pain, pain
      • Biden administration: spend, spend, spend
      • needs to be reconciled (won't happen -- certainly not in an election year)

Original Post

Jobs: the big story today. Until 7:40 and then the next big story comes along. This post will bring you up to speed.

From August 28, 2022: lots of room to put "millions out of work” and still stay below 3% U-1 unemployment.

Goldman Sachs: one day prior to the announcement --

**************************
Back to the Bakken

The Far Side: link here.

WTI: $88.23.

Natural gas: $9.008

Monday, September 5, 2022: 5 for the month, 55 for the quarter, 394 for the year
35443, conf, Whiting, Lapica 34-23TFH,

Sunday, September 4, 2022: 4 for the month, 54 for the quarter, 393 for the year
36643, conf, Hess, BL-S Ramberg-155-95-0601H-4,

Saturday, September 3, 2022: 3 for the month, 53 for the quarter, 392 for the year
37339, conf, Whiting, Ark 21-15-2H,
35444, conf, Whiting, Lapica 34-23HU,

Friday, September 2, 2022: 1 for the month, 51 for the quarter, 390 for the year
37338, conf, Whiting, Ark 21-15H,

RBN Energy: To counter Russia, Europe needs to integrate its far-flung natural gas networks.

Two of the biggest challenges that Europe faces in the race to wean itself off Russian natural gas are the need to develop new pipeline connections between the continent’s many isolated gas networks and to integrate the European Union’s multiple gas markets. Addressing these won’t be easy. Unlike the U.S., whose pipeline systems were designed to transport gas long distances and across jurisdictional lines, Europe’s networks are more regional or even local in nature, and only recently has the EU been taking steps to link the continent’s markets. Oh, by the way, U.S. producers and LNG exporters should care about all this, because if Europe gets its act together, it could become an even larger and longer-term recipient of gas originating from the Permian, Haynesville, Marcellus/Utica and other shale plays. In today’s RBN blog, we discuss the prospects for tying together the EU’s gas pipelines, gas storage facilities, LNG import terminals and gas markets.

The Russian war against Ukraine has focused Europe on the issue of energy security, especially as it relates to natural gas. The continent has previously relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas, but it now must scramble for new suppliers and alternative forms of energy. In addition to the struggles famously faced by countries like Germany, the matter is particularly urgent in a few countries along or very near the Russian border, including Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine itself. Almost two years ago the three countries formed the “Lublin Triangle,” an alliance of sorts with the aim of enhancing military, cultural and economic cooperation while also supporting Ukraine’s prospective integration into the EU and NATO.

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