Murex' Borstad Wells In West Tioga -- March 27, 2022

Updates

March 30, 2022:  from a reader; the reader's thoughts and my thoughts --

• Patterson 280 rigging is coming down today
• all wells drilled to depth
• the rig was a walking rig
• back and forth, the rig drilled the four wells to KOP
• once KOP reached in all four wells, rig walked back to complete the laterals
• some of this is fact; some conjectural; explains everything

Original Post

From a reader:

If you want to solve a real head scratcher figure out why Patterson 280 has been on the Murex Borstad 3 well pad all winter. I may be wrong but the way the rig is oriented on location leads me to believe they could still be on the first hole.

I drive past it at least 2x per day and there is little activity and there's always pipe in the derrick like they're tripping.

I'll come back to this one later. I don't have any news, but I need to spend some time on it. Later, some data:

The wells:

• 38598, conf, Murex, Sheldon Mark 34-22H-A 3MB, Tioga, no production data,
• 38599, conf, Murex, Borstad 34-10H-A 2MB, West Tioga,
  
• 38600, conf, Murex, Sheldon Mark 34-22H-A 2MB, Tioga,
  
• #38601, conf, Murex, Borstad 34-10H-1 1MB, West Tioga, no production data,
  

Patterson 280:

• November 30, 2021: --
• December 20, 2021: 38598, Murex, Sheldon Mark 34-22H-1-3MB -- first day;
  
• December 27, 2021: 38601, Murex, Borstad 34-10H-A 1MB
• December 30, 2022: 38600, Murex, Sheldon Mark 34-22H-A 2MB,
  
• January 18, 2022: 38600, Murex, Sheldon Mark 22-10H-A-2MB,
• February 28, 2022: 38599, Murex, Borstad 34-10H-A-2MB,
• March 25, 2022: 38601, Murex, Borstad 34-10H-A-1MB,
• --, 38598, Murex, Sheldon Mark 34-22H-A 3MB, Tioga
  

Energy News Over The Weekend -- March 27, 2022

Focus on fracking: weekly edition posted.

Oil: slumps

• Brent: drops 3.3%; down almost $4.00; trading at $116.70
• WTI: drops 3.5%; down almost $4.00; trading at $110, but did drop below $110, briefly

Diesel: rationing looms. 

The myth of spare capacity: link to Financial Times -- "you can't just turn on the taps." Bottlenecks hit hopes of US oil output surge. An article about a shortage of sand, and almost everything else connected with fracking.

Russia implodes: China's Sinopec bows out of Russian petchem, gas projects. Link here.

Xi will tread carefully: XI's gamble on Putin may be the most dangerous and short-sighted of his nine years in power. Link here. I disagree. The EU leaders have been incredibly un-helpful throough all of this. 

Russia: will likely default on April 4. The early $117 million interest payment was "peanuts" according to the $2.2 billion coming due. Link here.

Tesla: to halt Shanghai factory production; Covid curbs. Link here.

For The Archives -- What Folks Are Saying -- March 27, 2022

Locator: 10001ZEIHAN.

There have really been some great articles over the past few days -- March, 2022 -- the first month of the Russian-Ukraine war -- prior to the war, in the energy sector, major changes were occurring -- then the invasion -- wow -- a new world order -- we're living through it ... so these for the archives. And, then coming out of the pandemic.

One. "The geopolitical playbook worked (nearly) perfectly." ZeroHedge. Link here. 

One month ago, Deutsche Bank's Jim Reid published one of his trademark "Charts of the Day" which showed the historical playbook for how geopolitical events play out in markets, and which Reid says that in retrospect, he "might have retracted" if he could, as he had the lowest confidence in one or two weeks after publishing. But as it turned out, that playbook worked remarkably well with the S&P 500 now back above levels from the point where the US warned of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine late on Friday 11th February. This marked the start of the escalations and a geopolitical-induced market sell-off.

Two. Peter Zeihan, now being quoted by everyone everywhere.

• from chiefexecutive.net:

Even before the invasion of Ukraine, the five-decade growth of post-WWII globalization was in retreat, with myriad unintended consequences, and opportunities as well.

Author and advisor to CEOs and C-Suites Peter Zeihan has been watching it all play out, supplying a rich vein of geopolitical insights in books like The Accidental Superpower, The Absent Superpower and Disunited Nations. Zeihan has been a regular speaker at our Chief Executive leadership events, sharing his knack for mapping big-picture perspective to pragmatic business advice.

This June, he’ll publish The End of the World Is Just The Beginning, his take on, as he puts it “what happens with the major economic sectors post globalization”—a world where countries and regions make their own goods, grow their own food, secure their own energy and “do it all with populations that are both shrinking and aging.”

from The WashingtonPost: 

Ukraine war ends the world as we know it.

Three. The psychologist who coined the phrase, "Great Resignation" reveals how he saw it coming ... and whoo-hoo, the professor teaches at ... drum roll .... Texas A&M ... link here to businessinsider.

Who we are as an employee and as a worker is very central to who we are.

Four. The Great Resignation. The wiki entry

Resignation, also known as the Big Quit and the Great Reshuffle, is an ongoing economic trend in which employees have voluntarily resigned from their jobs en masse, beginning in early 2021, primarily in the United States.

Possible causes include wage stagnation amid rising cost of living, economic freedom provided by COVID-19 stimulus payments, long-lasting job dissatisfaction, and safety concerns of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some economists have described the Great Resignation as akin to a general strike.

The term was coined by Anthony Klotz, a professor of management at Mays Business School at Texas A&M University, who predicted the mass exodus in May 2021. 

Five. The great resignation is beginning too reverse course. Money from the stimulus payments has run out. Link to Barron's.

Initial Indications: Ukraine War Will Result In Increased Interest In Bitcoin -- March 27, 2022

Of course, "Bitcoin" is a metonym for cryptocurrency.

From Collin McLelland:

Re-posting from ZeroHedge via oilprice.com:

The fourth-largest oil company in the world is now considering taking its gas-to-bitcoin pilot to four countries. 

The largest U.S. oil producer Exxon Mobil is considering expanding its North Dakota bitcoin mining pilot program to further reduce the volume of natural gas it routinely burns off or flares into the atmosphere.

People familiar with the matter told [Bloomberg] that the oil giant has an agreement with Crusoe Energy Systems to redirect gas that would otherwise be wasted from an oil well pad to mobile bitcoin mines. The report said the pilot project launched in January 2021 in North Dakota’s Bakken and expanded in July; now, it consumes up to 18 million cubic feet of gas per month that Exxon couldn’t otherwise monetize.

Exxon is now considering similar pilot projects in Alaska, the Qua Iboe Terminal in Nigeria, Argentina’s Vaca Muerta shale field, Guyana and Germany, one of the people told Bloomberg.

I Don't Trust The Source At All -- But Makes For Interesting Reading -- Marh 27, 2022

Breaking: Mariupol is now 85% destroyed. Putin did not even have to use tactical nuclear weapons to accomplish this. But I'm curious: how was the 85% figure arrived at?  

Note: this may sound counter-intuitive, but for the US, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, regardless of outcome, the better for the US. China will also benefit. Biggest loser, of course, Russia, but the EU won't be far behind.  Oh, and then this, the longer the war lasts, the better for the Biden administration but, I think that's a given. The Biden administration has already convince Americans that the timeline for inflation, supply chain shortages, high cost of gasoline shifted to before the invasion.

Now, back to the original post.

This article at The New Yorker should be read alongside Peter Zeihan's analyses. Archived.

From the lede of the linked article:

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, ancient in many ways, has been notably modern in the centralized management of money. Elvira Nabiullina, the longtime governor of the Russian Central Bank was Europe’s 2017 “Central Banker of the Year,” according to the Banker magazine. Russia’s treasury recoups about twenty per cent of its G.D.P. as tax revenue, a figure far exceeding most other petrostates and on par with the United States. Moscow enjoys both fiscal and trade surpluses, and its debt load is low.

Every attempt to make sense of Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine has seemed obscured in an incense haze of past tsars, imperial designs, and Russian military history. But, to practitioners of economic statecraft, the situation is as clear as looking in a mirror. “It’s a pretty solid, talented group of technocrats there,” one senior Biden Administration official told me, of Russia’s central bankers. In any economic crisis, “we expected that they would respond smartly.”

What modern Russian economists have done is assemble an immense stockpile of foreign currency and gold: six hundred and thirty billion dollars, thirteen per cent of it in renminbi, twenty-two per cent of it in gold, and much of the balance in the major currencies of the economic West—euros, dollars, yen, pounds. The Russian currency stockpile eventually grew so vast that some Western financial analysts described it as “Fortress Russia”—if Russia were to be isolated in the event of a war, and the value of the ruble were to degrade, the foreign currencies could be used to stabilize the Russian economy and prevent a crisis.

In the medium term, at least, these reserves seemed to provide an economic buffer for Putin. Even if Europe were to cut off all imports of Russian energy, depriving Moscow of its main source of revenue, one analyst at the Atlantic Council told the Times, the reserves would allow Moscow to fill the gap for “several years.”

The proficiency of the Russian bankers posed a particular challenge to their Western counterparts. Authoritarian regimes are supposed to have the advantage of long-term planning, since their policies do not need to change with elections. If Russia, like China, was managing its economy as expertly as we could, then where was the advantage? When the G-7 gathered in Cornwall, in June, 2021, for its first in-person summit since the pandemic, President Biden tried to summon a sense of renewed post-Trump urgency, of liberal democracies uniting against authoritarianism, but there were still more basic doubts about the efficacy of the Western system. “We’ve been reflecting a lot on this discussion in the G-7, on how strong are democracies,” a senior E.U. official told me. “Sometimes, the feeling is that democracies are having a bit more challenges—sometimes, they’re cumbersome, and slower.”

Among the American delegation in the room was a figure who surely flew below the radar of Russian intelligence: a forty-six-year-old North Carolinian named Daleep Singh, who had recently been appointed as Biden’s deputy national-security adviser for international economics. Singh, who spent part of his early career at Goldman Sachs, had made his name as a market technician, having joined the markets room in the Obama Treasury Department, and then spent part of the Trump years as the vice-president for markets at the New York Fed. Singh had watched, with some skepticism, the growing esteem in which Russia was held on Wall Street, which hinged on the idea of its economic foresight. “I grew up in financial markets. I often hear from people in financial markets,” Singh told me last week. “And one of the myths I felt like they held—and it was kind of perpetrated by the Russian government—was that it had built an economic fortress around its economy, and that it was due to years and years of genius planning by Putin himself.”

The two great surprises of the first month of the war have been the strength of the Ukrainian resistance and the severity of the Western sanctions, which seem likely to prevent Russia from accessing its currency reserves. The effects of economic sanctions are just now beginning to be seen, but Sergei Guriev, a professor of economics at Sciences Po, in Paris, told me that he foresaw “Soviet stagnation, Soviet decline.” (There was a slight Soviet ambience this week, as viral videos showed Russians fighting over sugar in grocery stores, and a Russian government minister appeared on television to urge the public not to panic-buy essentials such as buckwheat.) If Russia’s misestimation of the Ukrainians was psychological, then its misestimation of Western sanctions was political and technical. The sanctions have a complex architecture—based on rules, economic levers, and the responses of Western companies and investors—but they also have an architect, a former Obama official told me. “The architect of these sanctions was Daleep Singh.”

Singh’s generation of liberals—those who graduated college around the time of 9/11—have returned to power from a very tense, four-year hiatus with two entangled challenges: to embody a return to sober order, after the mania of Donald Trump, and to pursue a bolder and more expansive response to the pressures of inequality and authoritarianism, problems that have come to seem far more acute since the Obama years. Singh himself has a slight throwback quality, to the manner of late-twentieth-century American liberalism—the casual language and formal suits, the Sorkinesque quickness, the tendency to talk about human mechanisms with the simplicity of economic graphs. When it came to sanctions, he had a characteristic mission: to expand on an Obama-era project. Run that scene again, but different this time.

The precedent had taken place in 2014, in the debate about how to sanction Russia after its invasion of Crimea. Beyond freezing the assets of certain oligarchs close to Putin, the Obama Administration designed its sanctions to keep a few large and influential Russian corporations (mostly banks and energy companies) from accessing Western debt. The choice was designed to exploit a specific vulnerability, one that Singh helped identify: in 2014, many of the most important Russian entities were in the midst of a debt binge, and were overexposed. In terms of potential severity, Edward Fishman, a leading Obama Administration sanctions official, told me that the 2014 sanctions had been a “two out of ten.” Still, combined with a bigger bust in the oil market, they caused some trouble. The Russian economy, which had been growing for several years, contracted in 2015. The ruble crashed, and inflation surpassed twelve per cent in the year after the invasion. And yet Putin’s power was largely undisturbed. If anything, the sanctions’ larger effect was to convince the Kremlin that it needed to build its stockpile. “We saw Russia in economic and fiscal vulnerability,” the senior Biden Administration official said. “We saw Russia respond with the central-bank tool, really kind of building up their reserves with the idea that if the U.S. comes after us again, we’ll need an even stronger central-bank backstop.”

Singh started thinking seriously about potential sanctions on Russia in early November, when U.S. intelligence assessments began to warn of a likely invasion of Ukraine. “We put our heads together and figured out where do we have strengths and where do our strengths intersect with Russian vulnerability—where is there an asymmetry,” Singh told me. One area was Russia’s access to Western technologies, such as microchips and software. Another potential vulnerability was the dependence of Russian banks on capital from overseas. Each of these moves exploited certain American advantages, but they did nothing to undermine the reserves Putin had built to make the Russian economy “sanction-proof.” So Singh turned to another point of asymmetry: the currency trade. “It’s true that the global economy has gotten increasingly multipolar over time—you could see that just as a percentage of world G.D.P.,” Singh said. But, when it came to the currency in which countries bought and sold things, saved money, and borrowed money, the dollar’s share was between sixty and eighty per cent. In the world of global finance, Singh said, “the dollar is still the operating system.”

Much, much more at the linked article. A keeper. 

The bottom, bottom line: the longer the war goes on in Ukraine, the worst things get for Russia's economy. Putin was counting on the protections noted above, but these protections would work only if:

• the war was short;
• he did not resort to biochemical weapons;
• he did not resort to tactical nuclear weapons;