Ukraine: Russians withdraw from Kherson. The timing is interesting. The announcement to withdraw was made by the Russians on Wednesday, November 9, 2022. Link here.
Russian oil production: could drop one million bopd (or more), to 9.0 million bopd, once the December sanctions kick in. Link here. With Baker Hughes leaving that pretty much ends all western oil field services technology responsible for Russian oil production.
- Russia's quota: 11 million bpd
- actual production, October, 2022: 9.9 bpd, excluding condensate
- and that was October; additional, more severe sanctions start in December, 2022
- by which time pretty much all western OFS technology will have also exited
- November quota: 10.5 million bpd
- EU to ban Russian imports of crude oil from December 5, 2022, and it's not likely that China, others have the storage facility to suck up all that "extra" oil
- will it become Russia oil vs Saudi oil for China?
Trump:
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Back to the Bakken
DUCs, link here.
After
seeing oil demand plunge in 2020, U.S. producers’ mantra switched to
“frack, baby, frack” as they paused drilling new rigs in favor of
completing—or fracking—wells that had already been drilled. Drilling is
just the first step in shale formations. Fracking, a process that
involves the injection of water, sand and chemicals into the drilled
well, actually gets the oil out of the ground.
Producers’
preference for completion over drilling has led to a steep decline in
the number of drilled but uncompleted wells, or DUCs, since August 2020.
That inventory is at five-year lows, according to Rystad Energy data.
While the U.S. Energy Information Administration counts all available
DUCs, Rystad and S&P Global Commodity Insights prefer to track wells
that are no more than two years old, because they are likely to be
completed at a later date. Any older, and the chances of completion get
much slimmer.
The Far Side: link here.
NDIC office closed: I assume. Due to "inclement" weather and Veterans Day.
Active rigs: perhaps less than 35 with another epic storm in the Bakken.
WTI:
Natural gas:
Sunday, November 13, 2022: 23 for the month, 60 for the quarter, 605 for the year.
38381, conf, Oasis, Swenson Federal 5197 43-35 3B,
Saturday, November 12, 2022: 22 for the month, 59 for the quarter, 604 for the year.
38271, conf, Whiting, Platt 44-18-2H,
Friday, November 11, 2022: 21 for the month, 58 for the quarter, 603 for the year.
38725,
conf, Slawson, Sauger Federal 5 SL
TFH,
38380,
conf, Oasis, Swenson Federal 5197 43-35 2B,
RBN Energy: mega rule puts all gas-gatherinng pipelines under federal scrutiny.
For decades, gas-gathering pipelines largely escaped the federal
scrutiny that was primarily focused on much bigger pipelines in more
populated areas. But all that has changed with final publication of the
so-called Mega Rule, which applies federal pipeline safety regulations
to hundreds of thousands of miles of gas-gathering pipelines —
previously not subject to federal safety regulation — for the first
time. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the history behind the three-part
Mega Rule, what it’s designed to do, and the challenges pipeline
operators will face to stay in compliance.
Today is Veterans Day, and we at RBN want to take a moment to thank all veterans for their service to our country.
Discussions about ways to improve natural gas pipeline safety go back
many years but gained greater prominence after a deadly explosion in
San Bruno, CA, in September 2010. In that incident, a 30-inch-diameter
segment of a state-regulated intrastate natural gas transmission
pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)
ruptured in a residential area of San Bruno, a city just south of San
Francisco. The released natural gas ignited, resulting in a fire that
destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70 others. Eight people were killed and
several dozen injured
According to the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), the explosion was caused by deficiencies in quality
assurance and quality control during the pipe’s installation as well as
an inadequate pipeline-integrity program that failed to detect the
defective section of pipeline.
California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) exemptions related to
pressure testing for existing pipelines, which likely would have
detected the installation defects, were also cited as a factor, as was
the CPUC’s failure to notice and address the inadequacies of PG&E’s
pipeline-integrity program.
